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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore the significance of 
the September 15 Tripartite Agreement in the context of 
labor regime change in South Korea. The paper describes 
the historical context of Korea’s labor politics, examining 
the limits to the 1987 labor regime and its reform. Next, 
the author summarizes the major content and controversial 
issues of the September 15 Tripartite Agreement. He then 
highlights the significance of the agreement as the first step 
in a labor regime transition that is based on dialogue and 
compromise. This sense of compromise is divergent from past 
processes of labor regime change in Korea and represents 
the best path towards a more sustainable regime with less 
social costs.
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Introduction
As symptoms of multiple crises in Korea’s labor regime²,³ 
grew serious, the Economic and Social Development 
Commission (ESDC) led the effort to reach a tripartite labor 
reform agreement between labor, management, and the 
government on September 15, 2015. The background of the 
September 15 Tripartite Agreement (henceforth the Sept 
15 Tripartite Agreement or the Agreement or the Tripartite 
Agreement) is stated as follows in the preamble: 
“The national economy faces severe challenges, 
including rapid globalization, a low fertility rate, and an 
aging population, as well as the transformation from an 
industrial focus to one based on knowledge, information, 
and services. However, the labor market is not functioning 
efficiently enough to help our nation overcome these 
difficulties and has failed to make sufficient contributions 
to economic growth and job creation. What is worse,  
labor market dualism is increasing among workers in 
different company sizes and employment types, and 
young workers, who are the future of this nation, are 
having great difficulty finding jobs.”⁴
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement marks a shift into a new labor 
regime by rejecting the current labor regime that has existed 
for almost 30 years since 1987. The new labor regime should 
consist of two basic axes, an integrated labor market and 
work-productivity alliance, and two auxiliary axes, developing 
flexibility to an adequate level in the labor market’s top 
layer based on a social consensus and developing functional 
flexibility of the internal labor structure of companies. To this 
end, there is a need for labor, management, and government 
to promote soft politics —in other words, sincere dialogue 
and compromise. This would enable the establishment and 
development of a consensus on the basic characteristics and 
content of the new labor regime.       
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Limits to the 1987 Labor Regime and its Reform
A paradigm crisis of the 1987 labor regime necessitated the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement. It is true that the 1987 regime contributed 
to increasing basic labor rights, expanding organized labor, and 
overcoming the economic crises of 1997 and 2008. However, 
the regime has steadily reached its limitation in sustainability 
with the emergence of challenges such as globalization, an aging 
population, low growth, and innovation of digital technologies.
The following provides a more detailed explanation of the 1987 
labor regime’s limitations. The first limitation is the labor market. 
An unprecedented quantitative and qualitative employment crisis 
has emerged, and the market’s dual structure has deepened. 
The seniority-based wage and rank system established during 
the period of industrialization and high economic growth led to 
a widening gap between wages and duties, performance, and 
productivity. Also, a mismatch of personnel supply and demand 
per section and skill level continues to persist.    
Second is the labor process. While labor-saving technological 
innovation gained speed in some areas, a combination of long 
labor hours and low labor productivity was firmly maintained in 
other areas.
Third is the reproduction of labor, an area in which Korea is in the 
worst state possible. Sustainability of the nation’s labor regime is 
under threat by various factors, including the high suicide rate, 
extremely low birth rate, low quality of life, poor social safety 
net, dependence on corporate welfare, worsening distribution 
structure, and maintenance of the traditional male single-income 
household model.⁵
Fourth, labor politics, through which various labor regime issues 
should be resolved, did not function adequately. Organized labor 
weakened and actual basic labor rights eroded, amid which 
confrontational labor-management relations continued. The lack 
of trust among labor, management, and government resulted in 
a standstill in the culture of social dialogue and compromise.
In the 1987 labor regime three major issues emerged concerning 
uncertainties in the labor market: ordinary wage, working hours, 
and extended mandatory retirement age. These issues as well 
as those stemming from the dual structure of the labor market, 
including temporary worker issues and the matter of the social 
safety net, raised awareness of the need to comprehensively 
resolve these issues among labor, management, and government.
A consensus was reached on the need for a social dialogue-based 
package deal to address the structural employment crisis. This 
included the so-called youth employment cliff, the institutional 
crisis that was triggered by a collision of administrative 
guidelines and precedents on ordinary wage/holiday work, 
and inefficiencies in labor market systems and practices. This 
was exacerbated by an impasse in labor politics, through which 
such issues should have been resolved. Efforts to address these 
issues led to the launch of the Special Committee on Structural 
Reforms of the Labor Market under the ESDC in September 2014, 
ultimately resulting in the September 15 Tripartite Agreement 
a year later. 
Various attempts were made to reform the structure of the 
labor market well before the Tripartite Agreement, including 
the February 6 Social Pact to Overcome the Economic and Social 
Crisis in 1998, and the May 30 Job Agreement to Reach an 
Employment Rate of 70 percent in 2013. Despite these attempts, 
significant improvements were not achieved in the labor market. 
On September 9, 2013, a decision was made to establish the 
Special Committee on Wage and Working Hours to resolve 
these two pending issues in the labor market, but the Special 
Committee was never launched. In response, the ESDC came to a 
decision to form a Special Committee on Structural Reforms of the 
Labor Market, which would replace the abovementioned Special 
Committee. The purpose of establishing the Special Committee 
was to reach an agreement for a more comprehensive structural 
reform of the labor market. The Special Committee on Structural 
Reforms of the Labor Market was officially launched through a 
resolution at a general meeting on September 19, 2014.  
Major developments after the launch of the Special Committee 
on Structural Reforms of the Labor Market can be divided into 
several phases. Phase one is from the launch of the Special 
Committee (September 2014) to when a basic agreement was 
“There is a steady rise in the 
need for a paradigm shift to 
new labor politics that are 
based on consensus by both 
labor and management to 
fulfill social responsibilities, 
thus engendering a transition 
to a new labor regime.”
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reached on the “principles and direction of structural reforms 
of the labor market” in December 2014. Phase two includes in-
depth discussions on the three top-priority agenda items after 
the establishment of the basic agreement and the discontinuance 
of dialogue. It ends with the accomplishment of the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement. Additional discussions have been held 
after the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement on key issues that were 
not settled. Table 1 provides major details of each phase.
Major Content and Controversial Issues of the 
September 15 Tripartite Agreement
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement consists of five parts.⁶ The 
first is the promotion of youth employment, with the following 
suggestions to achieve this end: increase new employment, 
provide support for win-win employment for all generations, 
bolster the competitiveness of SMEs, make joint efforts to provide 
increased support for business startups by young people, and 
establish a consultative body for promotion of youth employment.
Table 1. Developments of the Special Committee on Structural Reforms of the Labor Market under the Economic and 
Social Development Commission
Category Period Details
Phase 1 Sep 19-Dec 23, 2014 - Established and launched the Special Committee on 
Structural Reforms of the Labor Market
- Formed an expert group
- Chose five major agenda items and 14 detailed tasks
- Reached a basic agreement on “principles and direction 
of structural reforms of the labor market” 
Phase 2-1 Dec 23, 2014-Apr 8, 2015 -  Carried out in-depth discussions on top-priority agenda 
items but an agreement was not reached
Phase 2-2 April 9-Aug 25, 2015 - The Federation of Korean Trade Unions left the Special 
Committee on Structural Reforms of the Labor Market
- The government announced its plans to independently 
move forward with labor market reform, and the First Labor 
Market Reform Implementation Measure (June 17)
- A statement released by the president made known the president’s 
determination towards labor reform and called for concessions 
by labor and management as well as a great compromise by 
labor, management, and government (August 6, 2015)
Phase 2-3 Aug 26-Sep 15, 2015 - The Federation of Korean Trade Unions decided to return to the Special 
Committee on Structural Reforms of the Labor Market (August 26)
- Successfully reached the Tripartite Agreement on Structural Reforms 
of the Labor Market (September 15 Tripartite Agreement)
Phase 3 Sep 16, 2015- Present - Fact-finding surveys and discussions are taking place on key 
issues that were not resolved by the Tripartite Agreement 
and that were subject to future discussion
- Making efforts to reach an agreement on labor-management partnership, 
etc. that were not discussed from among five major agenda items
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Second is the alleviation of the dual structure of the labor 
market. Labor, management, and government agreed on win-win 
cooperation between primary contractors and subcontractors 
and between large companies and SMEs, improvements in non-
regular employment practices and discrimination remedies, and 
activation of the labor market. 
Third is the expansion of the social safety net. Detailed matters 
that were agreed upon include coverage beyond the current 
reach of social insurance, improvements in the structure of 
providing unemployment benefits, and detailed measures to 
build a competency-based society. 
Fourth is the establishment of a tripartite partnership, and 
implementation and promotion of the agreed matters.
Fifth is the resolution of the three pending issues of the labor 
market. Detailed measures to resolve these issues clarify the 
ordinary wage, reduce actual working hours, and improve 
the wage system in response to the extended mandatory 
retirement age.   
To resolve ordinary wage-related disputes, an agreement was 
reached to write into law the definition of ordinary wages and 
the criteria for wage elements excluded from ordinary wages 
based on the Supreme Court en banc decision of December 
2013. This agreement is expected to reduce conflicts over the 
coverage of ordinary wages between employees and employers. 
The Tripartite Agreement also reduced the working hour 
guidelines of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, stating “a 
week shall be 7 days, and the hours of work done on holidays 
shall be counted into overtime hours of work. Working hours 
per week shall be 52 hours (40 standard hours + 12 overtime 
hours).”⁷ The adoption of a special overtime work system and 
the extension of the unit reference period for flexible working 
time (from two weeks to one month in cases stipulated in the 
rules of employment, and from three months to six months in 
cases stipulated in an agreement between the employer and 
workers) may be a burden on the labor sector, but are intended 
to contribute to the soft landing of reduced working hours. 
Considering that the reduction of working hours is not a matter 
that can be resolved in a short period, these factors are expected 
to have a positive effect on the reduction of working hours in the 
mid- to long-term future. However, there still remain conflicts 
between labor and the government surrounding the following 
three unsettled issues. 
Issue 1: Clarifying the standards for employment contract 
termination (legalization of general dismissal) 
Laws in Korea allow for dismissals, based on justifiable reasons, 
such as ”layoffs from business reasons” and ”dismissal as a 
disciplinary action that is taken on an outcome attributable to 
a worker.”⁸ A subject that has become a matter of dispute is 
clarifying standards and procedures for companies to dismiss 
low performers and employees who fail to adapt to their jobs. 
In the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement, labor, management, and 
government agreed to work out ways to improve the existing 
system for employment contracts.⁹ In other words, they agreed 
to enact relevant laws in the mid- to long-term future. In the 
interim, to prevent possible disputes before institutional reforms 
are in place, the Agreement states, “the tripartite partners shall 
set up a fair evaluation scheme and clarify the standards and 
procedures for signing and terminating employment contracts 
based on laws and legal precedents.”¹⁰ However, labor unions 
point out that legalizing the general dismissal system may be a 
huge blow to the Korean labor market. They are also concerned 
over the possible abuse of the system.¹¹ This reminds us of the 
need for a prudent approach.
Issue 2: Unfavorable changes to rules of employment for adoption 
of wage peak system
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement requires the government to 
establish administrative guidelines on easing the requirements 
for unfavorable changes to rules of employment to ensure 
reasonable operations of the extended mandatory retirement 
age and wage peak system. This also inherently requires the 
government to engage in sufficient discussions with labor and 
management in this regard. Unlike collective agreements, rules 
of employment are rules on workers’ wages and other working 
conditions, solely set by a company. The current Labor Standards 
Act stipulates that labor union consent be received to change 
the rules of employment when changes are disadvantageous 
to workers and a labor union that represents the majority of 
employees. It stipulates that consent be received from the 
majority of workers if there is no such labor union.¹²
The wage peak system has significance in that it reduces 
companies’ increased burdens of labor costs with the launch of 
the mandatory, legal retirement age of 60 in 2016 and serves as 
a means to ensure the settlement of the extended mandatory 
retirement age. The adoption of the wage peak system will prevent 
a sharp decline in companies’ ability to hire new personnel. 
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However, it remains uncertain if the wage peak system will lead to 
the promotion of youth employment. Corporate recruitment of 
personnel depends on several variables. The thought that simply 
adopting the wage peak system will increase youth employment 
is based on excessively simple logic. However, if the government 
implements various policy measures in parallel, such as the win-
win employment support fund system, the wage peak system 
may lead to youth employment-promoting effects, although in 
a limited way.
In general, changes in the requirements for unfavorable changes 
to rules of employment have substantial ripple effects. For 
this reason, the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement restricts the 
requirements and processes for changing rules of employment 
to the purpose of adopting the wage peak system. 
Issue 3: Extension of the permitted period of fixed-term 
contract workers and expansion of jobs permitted for 
temporary agency work
The Tripartite Agreement states the following: “the tripartite 
partners shall work out solutions by inviting relevant parties to 
participate in intensive programs such as joint fact-finding surveys 
and collection of expert opinions. The agreements reached as a 
result shall be reflected in the process of adopting proposed bills 
during the regular session of the National Assembly.”¹³ Areas for 
further discussion covered by this include the permitted period 
and renewal frequency of fixed-term contract workers as well as 
jobs permitted for temporary agency work. 
While these issues among others have been left as topics for 
further discussion, the ruling party has submitted a bill to amend 
the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Fixed-Term and Part-Time 
Workers and the Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary Agency 
Workers. This reflects the ruling party’s determination to quickly 
amend these acts. There is a need to establish details through 
close discussions among labor, management, and government 
after fact-finding surveys and collection of opinions of relevant 
parties, with the ultimate purpose of strengthening job security 
and protection of temporary workers.   
The solution to the temporary worker issue is a matter of 
compromising ideals with reality. Diversity in forms of employment 
is a global trend and a general tendency that is difficult to go 
against. In Korea’s labor market, however, companies are abusing 
temporary positions for the purpose of avoiding labor unions as 
well as wage costs and employment flexibility. A way of resolving 
the temporary worker issue can be to substantially raise costs 
incurred from using temporary workers. Companies will be able 
to flexibly use temporary workers but will have to pay the price 
in terms of compensation, including wages, working conditions, 
and welfare. 
In general, stronger regulations on using temporary agency 
workers result in increased in-house subcontracting. There 
has been a gradual rise in the number of temporary agency 
workers since the enactment of the Act on the Protection, Etc. of 
Temporary Agency Workers. However, several regulations in the 
Act are preventing widespread use of temporary agency workers. 
The bill on amending the Act that was submitted by the ruling 
party mainly allows temporary placement of middle-aged people 
(55 years or older) and highly-paid, specialized job workers as 
well as temporary placements to root industries. The future 
outcome of discussions is yet unknown, but there is a chance that 
this bill will result in a considerable increase in temporary agency 
workers. There are concerns over deterioration in the quality of 
jobs for middle-aged people and highly-paid, specialized jobs. 
Outlook from Tripartite Members
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement is receiving different responses 
from various circles. Many experts, the general public, and the 
government focus on the establishment and overall content of 
the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement, having a positive opinion of it. 
In contrast, some in labor and management are voicing strong 
criticism, questioning labor reform implementation methods 
and compromises made on key issues. 
The Federation of Korean Trade Unions reached the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement on behalf of the labor sector. As such, it 
acknowledges that it is partially responsible for the inclusion of 
the general dismissal system and changes to rules of employment 
in the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement. The Federation stresses 
that it has reached a significant outcome in that it blocked the 
government’s attempt to unilaterally implement administrative 
guidelines, expanded the social safety net, and improved 
employment conditions for temporary workers. The Federation 
assesses that the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement was the second 
best outcome. The Federation also made known its plans to make 
every effort possible to prevent “easy dismissal” and “easing of 
unfavorable changes to rules of employment” through parallel 
execution of negotiations and struggles.¹⁴
Some in the radical labor sector, including the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions, define the Sept 15 Tripartite 
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Agreement as part of a ”retrogressive revision of labor” attempt, 
and fully oppose the Agreement.¹⁵ What they are mainly 
criticizing is that the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement has opened 
the door to the adoption of the general dismissal system (easy 
dismissal system) and easing of the requirements and procedures 
for unfavorable changes to rules of employment. They believe 
the adoption of the general dismissal system will bring about 
a huge disaster to workers. They also point out that the 
outcomes that the Federation of Korean Trade Unions regard as 
significant achievements are subject to “sufficient negotiations” 
and “discussions,” and that there is therefore a high chance 
that these matters will be enforced or put off based on the 
government’s will.  
The business sector acknowledges that the Agreement is an 
incomplete compromise in that key issues were not clearly 
resolved, such as the general dismissal system and changes to 
rules of employment. Korea Employers’ Federation praises the 
successful reaching of an agreement for structural reform of 
the labor market, and is calling for its speedy execution.¹⁶ The 
conservative camp believes that adopting social dialogue and 
compromise as a means to move forward with labor reform is 
an issue itself, and criticizes that there is no actual outcome in 
the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement. It claims that the government 
should take responsibility and lead labor reform.¹⁷
The ruling party praises the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement, stating 
that the Agreement signifies the beginning of labor reform. It 
has most quickly implemented follow-up measures. Immediately 
after the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement, the ruling party held 
government-ruling party consultations and a general meeting 
of the National Assembly members of the ruling party. It then 
created bills on amending five major laws related to labor reform: 
Labor Standards Act, Act on the Protection, Etc. of Fixed-Term 
and Part-Time Workers, Act on the Protection, Etc. of Temporary 
Agency Workers, Employment Insurance Act, and Occupational 
Health and Safety Insurance Act – and tabled the bills at the 
National Assembly.¹⁸
A Vision of a New Labor Regime
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement is the first step of a shift in the 
labor regime (labor reform). Future steps are very important. In 
this context, the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement should be developed 
into a work-productivity alliance that is adequate for Korea. 
The top-priority of the work-productivity alliance should 
be to make quantitative and qualitative improvements 
to employment. To maintain the work alliance, labor and 
management should jointly strive to bolster productivity 
through innovation of the wage and job system as well as the 
workplace. Joint labor-management efforts for innovation of 
productivity are a strong means of practical support for the 
work alliance. Essential elements of the work-productivity 
alliance are innovation in methods of work based on labor and 
management participation and cooperation, the adoption of 
a worker representation system that is adequate for Korea’s 
unique circumstances, participation in corporate management, 
and the adoption of a joint decision system.  
In addition, the social safety net needs to be expanded and 
made stronger—including the pension system, employment 
insurance, and occupational health and safety insurance—based 
on which flexibility and stability in the labor market should 
be pursued. The government should reduce or remove social 
exclusion by switching to an inclusive growth strategy. Labor and 
management should faithfully execute agreed matters based 
on a partnership and recover trust, thereby striving to establish 
labor-management partnership relations.  
Major issues that were not completely agreed upon as part of the 
Tripartite Agreement remain as mid- to long-term tasks. These 
include general dismissal, the requirements and procedures for 
changing rules of employment, and alleviation of regulations 
on fixed-term contract and temporary agency work. These key 
issues require additional dialogue and compromise among 
labor, management, and government. Before the government 
establishes relevant guidelines and amends relevant laws, 
there is a need for objective confirmation of facts, gathering of 
stakeholder opinions, dialogue among labor, management, and 
government based on trust and good faith, and the execution 
of adequate roles by expert groups. The labor sector should 
also formulate more practical and reasonable employment 
strategies, and double its efforts to persuade the management, 
government, and general public.
The vision of the new labor regime that will be established on 
the occasion of the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement can be set as 
an inclusive and innovative labor regime that is based on Korea’s 
unique flexibility and stability.
The inclusive and innovative labor regime can consist of two 
basic axes and two auxiliary axes. The two basic axes are an 
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integrated labor market and work-productivity alliance. The two 
auxiliary axes are enhancing flexibility to an adequate level in 
the primary labor market’s top layer based on a social consensus 
and developing functional flexibility of the internal labor 
markets of companies. 
An integrated labor market should be given concrete form by 
means of expanding the social safety net through universal 
welfare, alleviating the dual structure and polarization in the 
labor market, protecting the vulnerable class, and increasing 
basic labor rights. The new labor regime should be focused on 
an integrated labor market, work-oriented policies as well as 
business and labor-management practices that enable such a 
market, and innovation of the workplace and productivity that 
physically supports the creation and maintenance of a greater 
number of better jobs. It should be developed in the direction of 
reducing the excessive degree of rigidity in the large company and 
public sectors, regular positions, and upper layers of organized 
labor, and in the direction of expanding functional flexibility in 
wages, working hours, work organization, and training of the 
internal labor market. Restructuring labor politics is an essential 
part of shaping new labor regime and its developments.
Restructuring Labor Politics
Up until 1987, Korea had state-led labor politics, where even 
basic labor rights were suppressed. In opposition, a radical labor 
movement emerged with the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle. 
Market-led neoliberal labor politics emerged after the Asian 
financial crisis until their limitations were exposed. Labor politics 
in Korea have been in a state of impasse for a long period, where 
labor, capital, or the state cannot exercise hegemony. This has led 
to a continued delay in the structural reform of the labor regime. 
Further information on the defining characteristics of the stages 
of Korea’s labor regime is presented in Table 2. 
Labor movements under the 1987 labor regime were carried 
out based on the following tacit assumption: once strong 
labor unions at large companies and in the public sector make 
improvements in wages, welfare, and other working conditions 
Table 2. Development of the Labor Regime and Characteristics in Korea
Category Authoritarian labor regime Neoliberal labor regime
Period 1961 - 1987 Transition period (1987 - 1997) 1998 - Present
Factor that led to transition Establishment of the military 
authorities – bureaucrat 
governing system
The Great Workers’ 
Struggle in 1987
Financial crisis in 1997 and 
change of government
Leading power State (Military authorities-
bureaucrats)
Each axis (labor-management, 
labor-government)
Market (Company-led)
Characteristics Labor market - High economic growth 
and rise in jobs
- Continued rise in 
wages under basic low-
wage conditions 
- Company-led job security
- Continued increase in jobs
- Considerable 
increases in wages
- Basic job security conditions
- Formation of a dual 
labor market
- Emergence of  
employment crisis
- Stagnation in wages and 
reduction in real income
- Increased polarization 
in the labor market
Labor process - Ultra long hours of labor
- Despotic production system
- High industrial accident risks
- Labor-intensive labor 
process and low 
labor productivity
- Long hours of labor
- Workplace is an arena 
of competition
- Rationalization of the 
workplace and increased 
labor productivity
- Long hours of labor
- Labor-saving technological 
innovation, and labor saving
- Recovery of management 
initiative 
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through struggles, the outcome of the struggles will later be 
shared by workers at private SMEs, temporary workers, and 
unorganized workers not part of labor unions. This assumption 
was somewhat realized from the second half of the 1980s to 
the mid-1990s.¹⁹ However, the connection between the leading 
section and the rear section rapidly weakened with the coming 
of the second phase of the 1987 labor regime after the 1997 
financial crisis. 
In some aspects, there is even a paradoxical phenomenon of 
“forward acquisition, rear loss.” This unintentional phenomenon 
is where improvements in wages and working conditions at 
large companies for regular workers and organized workers lead 
to a deterioration in wages and working conditions at SMEs 
and for temporary and indirectly employed workers as well 
as unorganized workers. This can be attributed to corporate 
management strategies and a lack of interest by regular worker-
led labor unions for unorganized workers.  
Company-level organizations and bargaining practices are 
deeply rooted. Also, representation of labor unions is weak, 
as reflected in labor union density and a collective agreement 
application rate of around 10 percent. There are great conflicts 
and confrontations between labor and management, and a 
grave sense of mistrust between the two parties. Militant labor 
movements take place, rather than dialogue and compromise. 
The leading labor union organizations are even divided into 
two major federations. Also, the Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions refuses to participate in the ESDC, which is a social 
dialogue body. There were continued attempts to make labor 
movement camps into a political power group, but there is no 
party politics system that politically represents the interests of 
worker groups. These are the major structural characteristics 
of labor politics in Korea. These conditions make it difficult for 
social dialogue and compromise among labor, management, 
and government at the national level. 
Reproduction 
of labor
- Increase in population 
and urbanization
- Poor social welfare
- No corporate welfare
- Aging population, and lesser 
increases in population
- Expansion of the 
social safety net
- Improvements in 
income distribution
- Expanded corporate 
welfare and gap in size
- Low birth rate, rapid 
aging population
- Increased discrepancy 
between personnel 
supply and demand
- Worsened distribution 
structure
- Reduced corporate welfare
Labor politics - Oppressive and exclusive 
labor politics, restrictions 
on labor rights
- Company-level labor 
union and bargaining
- Embracing organized labor 
as a subordinate partner
- Dominating ideology
(Economic growth, 
modernization, 
anticommunism, division)
- Expansion of basic labor 
rights, including the right 
to organization and right 
to collective action 
- Increased organized labor
- Fierce labor-management 
conflicts and confrontations
- Labor division and 
domination strategies of 
the state and capital
- Dominating ideology
(Growth, stability, labor-
management agreement 
versus hierarchy)
- Weakened and isolated 
labor movements
- Operation of social 
dialogue politics
- Erosion of actual 
basic labor rights
- Dominating ideology
(Economic crisis, win-win 
relationship between labor 
and management, social 
responsibility, dialogue)
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The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement, which was established under 
such adverse conditions, can be regarded as an exceptional 
outcome that is close to a miracle and is difficult to explain 
with the previous traditional corporatist theory. In the view 
of traditional corporatism that emphasizes the role of major 
interest groups representing labor and employers, a social pact 
can be successfully achieved through cooperative interaction 
among tripartite members.20, 21
There is a steady rise in the need for a paradigm shift to new 
labor politics that are based on a consensus by both labor and 
management to fulfill social responsibilities for a transition to a 
new labor regime.22 Party politics, labor policies, and corporate 
labor-management strategies that exclude labor and a militant 
labor movement model are losing effect. The direction for 
change and development of labor politics is a switchover from 
hard politics, characterized by power and market strength and 
aim at domination through control, to soft politics, which target 
the arbitration of interests through dialogue and compromise 
among stakeholders (see Table 3). That is, soft politics aims to 
develop reconstitution of the labor regime through strategic 
social dialogue and compromise by means of communication 
among economic and social agents.
The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement is thought of as one of the 
valuable outcomes of soft politics. Interaction among labor, 
management, and government needs to be carried out through 
soft politics based on a new balance of power. To this end, expert 
groups need to actively participate and perform their roles from 
an objective, neutral, and impartial stance on the direction and 
content of labor reform. Also, labor union movements should be 
carried out with the effort of building politics that are focused 
on recovering solidarity among different labor parties. In this 
perspective, the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement would be fruitful, 
if it is rooted in soft politics.
Table 3. Change from Hard Politics to Soft Politics²³
Category Hard politics Soft politics
Target Domination Coordination
Organizational principle Hierarchical organization Horizontal, network organization
Means
Force (Power, market power, 
organizational power, etc.)
Communication
Method of operation Control, struggle Dialogue and compromise
The need for this reconstitution of labor politics becomes more 
evident when considering the process of the Sept 15 Tripartite 
Agreement. Methods of a labor regime shift can be categorized 
into three types: where the government or the market takes the 
lead, where the labor sector takes the lead, and where dialogue 
and compromise between all parties takes place. 
The government/market-led method has a high possibility but 
accompanies considerable social conflicts and costs. The labor 
sector-led method has a low possibility and incurs high social 
costs. In contrast, the dialogue/agreement approach is the best 
choice in terms of social costs as well as sustainability.
In the historical context of Korea’s labor politics, the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement signifies the first step towards a labor 
regime transition that is based on dialogue and compromise. 
This is why it is distinctive from past processes of change in the 
labor regime.
Conclusion
What is needed above all is to have the Sept 15 Tripartite 
Agreement continue to have power and to implement some 
of the outcomes in the near future. Matters that have little or 
no possibility of being disputed should be executed as soon as 
possible. These include the promotion of youth employment, 
improving employment insurance and occupational health 
and safety insurance, and addressing the three major pending 
issues. The outcomes of the social agreement should be made 
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into reality. The Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement Execution Review 
Team which was recently established in the ESDC could be used 
to clearly make known the determination of labor, management, 
and government to push forward measures in the Agreement. 
Moreover, the purpose, direction, and content of the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement should be accurately publicized to labor, 
management, and the general public. This is all the more 
important considering that there are currently many disputes as 
a result of misunderstandings or distortions of the agreement’s 
content and processes. Various approaches should be adopted 
to this end, such as an open forum. There is a need to clearly 
inform the people of the purpose and direction of the Sept 15 
Tripartite Agreement, which is the following: to take preemptive 
measures to prevent a domestic crisis and limit the damage 
from an overseas crisis; to build a foundation for sustainable 
economic and social development by overcoming the serious 
dual structure in the labor market; and to reduce the gap with 
temporary workers and facilitate labor market functions.
Another important task is strengthening the position and 
leadership of labor and management organizations. Labor, 
management, and government should make a purposeful 
effort so that the Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement may serve as an 
opportunity for labor and management groups to strengthen 
their positions as the main agents of social dialogue and 
compromise. To this end, labor, management, and government 
should respect the spirit of the Agreement and faithfully 
execute its content. 
The three parties need to make sincere efforts to maintain mutual 
trust and protect the Sept 15 Agreement based on the spirit of 
compromise. They should overcome the temptation to quickly 
get matters done, and remind themselves why they reached an 
agreement and for whom labor regime restructuring is carried 
out. They should never forget that the most important tasks in 
the mid- to long-term future are the removal of the economic 
and social dual structure as well as employment issues. Based 
on such a direction and consensus, the parties should identify 
solutions for key issues that were tentatively mended by the 
Sept 15 Tripartite Agreement. These include the adoption of 
the general dismissal system, fixed-term and temporary agency 
workers, and measures to remove discrimination against 
temporary workers. 
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